Introduction
In this chapter we look at the question of convergence in corporate governance by evaluating dissident proxy proposals in Canada. We build on earlier research on the dynamics of dissident proxy initiatives in the US (David, Bloom, and Hillman, 2007) and in Canada (Bates and Hennessy, 2010) , with a detailed evaluation of the actors who file and respond to dissident proxy proposals. What does convergence mean in this context? From a regulatory and legal perspective, corporate governance in Canada is very similar to the US, with a shared Common Law heritage as former colonies of Great Britain. Yet important differences also exist. Canada has much smaller capital markets organized around provincial regulatory agencies. Publicly-held corporations in Canada are concentrated in fewer sectors, and large Canadian corporations are, on average, much smaller than large US corporations. Canadian regulations have enabled families to control corporations with supermajority voting shares. Founders and heirs who serve as executives are regularly featured in the Canadian business press, as are executives at large institutions. The discourse around corporate governance in the Canadian business press reflects the proximity of the US and exposure to print and broadcast media creating a rationale for convergence around codes for corporate governance (Enrione, Mazza, and Zerboni, 2006) . These countries are similar in regulation, and likely to be similar in mindset, so differences in the way dissident proxy contests play out are likely to be minor in regulation as well as behavior. What form do barriers to convergence take in this context? Dissident proxy initiatives are a direct challenge to corporate management and the board. They contain assertions of filers' views of what constitutes legitimate modes of conduct for the corporation, and can be seen as legitimacy contests between filers and corporate management (Bates and Hennessy, 2010). Dissident, or unsolicited, proposals are published along with those management is required to file annually, which ask shareholders to elect board members and approve the auditor. Dissident proxies assert the legitimacy of specific practices, and exhort management to adopt them. They are an effective way to raise questions about corporate management's conduct, and often enable filers to negotiate with management when management wishes to avoid publishing them. They are also effective in broadcasting filers' concerns to all shareholders. However, they are not an effective way of forcing corporate management to change in Canada, because most cannot pass without the support of management or family members with controlling shares. Both the US and Canada have embraced regulatory support for dissident proxy initiatives as part of a broader shareholder rights agenda, but how they function in each country may be different.
Convergence is one of the central concerns of this book and an important issue for both regulators and activist shareholders (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009) . Although dissident proxy initiatives are common within the Anglo-American sphere of corporate governance, factors specific to particular environments play a role in determining their impact on corporations' decision making. The relatively rapid adoption of legal structures making it easier and less costly to file dissident proxy proposals seems to support the convergence hypothesis (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009) . But do dissident proxy proposals function as they do in other parts of the Anglo-American sphere? Even with convergence in regulations, will factors specific to Canada lead to differences in practice? We evaluate the characteristics of the Canadian corporate governance to develop situated hypotheses about the actors involved in dissident proxy proposals that will enable us to compare it to their role of dissident proxy initiatives in other parts of the Anglo-American sphere of corporate governance. We begin with a more detailed discussion of Canadian corporate governance.
Dissident proxies in Canadian corporate governance
Canada's corporate governance environment has many similarities with the other members of the Anglo-American sphere, such as the concentration of ownership through institutional holdings. However, there are differences, primarily in terms of family-controlled corporations, dual class shares, and cross holding of shares (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
